Introduction
Emmis Communications (NASDAQ:EMMS) is a Nasdaq-listed radio broadcaster that was founded in 1979 by Jeffrey H. Smulyan. Headquartered in Indianapolis, the company, known for creating the world's first 24-hour all-sports radio station (WFAN) in 1987, went public in 1994. At its high point in early 2000, the company sported a $2.8 billion market cap, with peak revenues of nearly $600 million in fiscal 2004. Over the years, the company owned domestic television stations, ran a publishing division, and even operated radio stations in Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia, and Argentina.
With the recession of 2008-2009, the company found itself over-levered, and has generally been engaged in various asset sales since. About a decade ago, Emmis got out of the TV business. A few years ago, the company completely got out of the foreign radio business. In the last year, the company has essentially sold off its entire publishing division. Until recently, the company had operated the 9th largest radio portfolio in the U.S., based on total listeners. However, most significantly, in May, the company announced the sale of its flagship L.A. station for $82.5 million. With that sale now closed, as well as factoring in an expected sale of an AM station in New York, as well as an eventual sale of company-owned land outside Indianapolis, Emmis will be left with 3 FM stations in New York, and clusters in St. Louis, Austin, and Indianapolis, with pro forma revenues of $100 million, annual TTM adjusted EBITDA of roughly $18 million, and roughly $60 million in net (recourse) debt.
The current market cap of the company is $31 million, providing a pro forma EV/EBITDA of just over 5.0x, a "normalized" free cash flow yield of over 27%, and an estimated future fully taxed PE multiple of only 5x. The company also owns its "emerging technology" ventures, NextRadio and Digonex. Both are major cash burners (the above financial metrics exclude their losses) and are carried on the balance sheet for essentially zero, yet offer huge upside potential.
Emmis Is Controlled By Its Founder, Chairman, And CEO Jeffrey Smulyan
The Company was founded in 1979 by Indianapolis native Jeff Smulyan. Smulyan, possessing both undergraduate and law degrees from USC, grew the company, eventually taking it public in 1994. He owns all of the Class B common stock, giving him 10 votes for every single vote of the company's Class A common shareholders. Smulyan controls the company through such arrangement, possessing 51.1% of total voting authority...although he only owns roughly an 11% total economic interest (excluding stock options) in the company.
Jeff Smulyan Is A Skilled Brand Builder, Radio Industry "Godfather," And Dynamic Visionary
In a radio industry that has been declining by one or two percentage points a year, many players have sought to deal with the industry shrinkage by manically seeking to grow scale and cut costs. The upshot has been an increased proliferation of stultifying standardized formats, and the evisceration of "local flavor." Famously, Jeff Smulyan has defied this conventional wisdom, competed on his own terms, and continued to stick to what he does best in radio, which is building strength in select markets, attracting talent, creating great community love, affection, "buy-in" and brand value for his stations...and growing his market share.
For most of the past several years, the company has been almost continually growing share in its secondary (non big-city) markets. It has achieved an enviable total market share of greater than 40% in Austin, Texas. It has increased its total market share in Indianapolis from less than 20% in 2009, to 31% in fiscal 2017. And it has increased its total market share from 21% to 24%, in just the past 2 years, in St. Louis.
Smulyan treats his people well, extracting fierce levels of loyalty and commitment from "his troops." Emmis has been listed on Fortune Magazine's prestigious "100 Best Companies to Work For" list, as well as on the Indiana Chamber of Commerce's "Indiana's Best Places to Work" list. As a result, Smulyan is able to garner a tremendous work output from his people, and, in difficult times, a willingness on their part to financially sacrifice, and work even harder. (This strength of the corporate culture was almost certainly a key factor, which allowed the company to survive the 2008-2009 downturn.)
Trouble At Emmis's Former Flagship L.A. Radio Station Causes Damage But The Recently Closed Sale Of The Station Unlocks Value And Reduces Risk
Emmis had been operating KPWR, Power 106 in Los Angeles, since Smulyan's purchase of it in 1984. The hip-hop station was a powerhouse, generating roughly 40% of Emmis's station operating income, in the best of years. Unfortunately, a competing station poached Emmis's primary on-air talent, "Big Boy," in February 2015. The result was devastating, in terms of ratings (and profit) declines at the station. Specifically, KPWR's operating income swooned from $14.5 million in fiscal 2015, to $7.0 million in fiscal 2017.
Consequently, earlier this year, the company, with its money draining (but promising) emerging technology ventures, trading at upwards of 5.5x leverage, was deemed to be at risk of default, with its lending covenants stepping down. Fortunately, Emmis was able to find a buyer for KPWR, in the Meruelo Group, willing to pay $82.75 million, or an impressive 13x trailing 12-month station operating income. Gratifyingly, the buyer (a huge personal fan of the station in his youth) ascribed much goodwill, vanity, and "turnaround value" to KPWR.
The sale provided Emmis a very nice premium, for an asset that was being carried on the company's books for essentially zero. (After 33 years of ownership, all goodwill and intangibles had already been written down, under prior GAAP conventions.) The very recent closing of the sale of KPWR will allow Emmis to meet its amended debt covenants, and eventually refinance its debt at lower interest rates, while taking liquidity risk completely off the table.
Rather astonishingly, this important risk reduction is something the Street has completely ignored, showing how inefficient the marketplace is in valuing thinly traded microcaps. (Initially, on the announcement of the KPWR sale back in May, Emmis's stock shot up from $2.50, to as high as $3.87. Now, even with the transaction having closed several weeks ago, and the "money in the bank," the stock has, inexplicably, completely retraced to where it was just before the transaction was announced.)
The KPWR Sale, Combined With Other Recent And Pending Asset Sales, Make Emmis's Undervaluation Dramatically More Apparent
Over the last year, combining the sale of KPWR for $82.75 million (mostly shielded from taxation because of NOL carryforwards), with the company's previous sale of all but one of its magazines for $31.5 million, along with the anticipated sale of AM station WLIB in New York for about $10 million, and a possible land sale for $10 million, the company will have gone from about $180 million in net (recourse) debt, to about $60 million, a reduction of two-thirds. And yet, adjusted EBITDA of $33 million, prior to the aforementioned asset sales, will be declining to a recurring annual amount of $18 million, a reduction of only 45%. (Adjusted EBITDA excludes the sizable $8 million ongoing annualized run rate of losses from the emerging technology ventures.) It should be fairly obvious that a 67% reduction in net debt, that is only accompanied by a 45% reduction in adjusted EBITDA, will make the underlying value of Emmis all the more apparent to the Street, reduce leverage risk, and allow the company to be valued at a higher multiple. This is all the more true since the sale of KPWR will result in a mammoth accounting gain (to be reported in the current fiscal 2nd quarter which just ended August 31st), that will return Emmis to a substantial positive net worth position, for the first time in many years, which will allow the company to now "show up" on discount-to-book value stock screens. (After all expected asset sales are completed, I estimate an adjusted net worth of $85 million, and a book value of roughly $6.80 per share, putting the company at just .37x book, with a debt/equity ratio of only 70%.)

While Fiscal Q1 Results Were Terrible, The Company Has Righted The Ship, And Guidance For The Future Is Much Improved
The company's net revenues were down 6.7% in Q1, in markets that were down 1.4%, evidencing significant underperformance that is quite atypical for Emmis. A major cause of the underperformance is the fact that ad rates were down a very disconcerting 11% in the quarter, even though total minutes sold were up 1%. This pricing problem is likely short term in nature, and largely attributable to the New York market, where large financially strapped competitors are "dumping" ad inventory in the short term, and pressuring prices.
The good news is that with sales personnel changes made earlier this year in New York "beginning to bear fruit," and ratings now in an upswing (with Emmis's WQHT "Hot 97" in New York rated #1 among 18-34 year olds, for the last few months), it should result in improved revenues later this year. The proof is already in the pudding, as the company stated, in its Q1 conference call, that the 2nd quarter is pacing up 1-2%, with Smulyan further stating that "we believe that the downturn [we have been in] for much of the last 6 months may be behind us. We're encouraged." Meanwhile, over the long term, the company will likely be able to continue to outperform overall, in its three secondary markets, and may possibly return to outperforming in New York, as well.
The Company Is Engaged In Emerging Technology Ventures, Valued At Zero On The Balance Sheet, That Have Huge Upside Potential
The "crown jewels" of these ventures is NextRadio. NextRadio is the company's smartphone application that marries over-the-air FM radio broadcasts with visual and interactive features on smartphones. The app allows users to listen to their favorite local radio station using the FM chip in their smartphone (avoiding the consumption of expensive bandwidth, and extending battery life). In an impressive and dogged 7-year build out effort, all smartphone carriers and manufacturers in the U.S. are now on board with NextRadio, with the exception of Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL). (Emmis recently decided to offer the app for the iPhone using streaming technology--since Apple continues to refuse to turn on the FM chip in the iPhone.)
It is important to note that 80% of domestic radio listening is done on stations whose operators are participant "members" in NextRadio. Emmis's 7 year build out effort involved Jeff Smulyan traipsing the halls of Congress (to get the FM chip turned on in smartphones) and, in a testament to the spellbinding influence of Smulyan in the radio industry (combined with the leadership of Division President Paul Brenner), the industry has given Emmis the prestige and trust (and future profitability potential) of allowing the company to be the smartphone based proprietary pass-through portal, or "aggregator," of the entire domestic radio industry, for delivering its content, and providing a single platform to national advertisers.
While revenues for NextRadio have been miniscule to date, the company recently announced the commercial availability of the Dial Report, the first radio data management platform to accumulate and measure over 250 demographic, behavioral, and listening data points in near real time. Essentially, the Dial Report provides radio advertising buyers and sellers big data analytics derived from NextRadio's nationwide radio station network, smartphone usage, location-based data, demographic profiling and listening data. Among other things, the Dial Report will allow agencies and advertisers to identify hyper-specific audiences and target them with unmatched precision. One high profile company involved in this early stage adoption of the Dial Report is the country's largest advertiser, Home Depot.
Finally, Emmis has introduced NextRadio to the rest of the major countries in the Western Hemisphere (Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc.), which is especially appealing, as listenership of FM radio on smartphones is already well established in Latin America, compared to the U.S.
Just to envision the potential of NextRadio, by way of comparison, while Emmis only has a $31 million market cap, there has been talk of money-losing Spotify being valued by private-market investors at $8.5 billion. And money-losing Pandora is currently being valued at a market cap of $2 billion. While a currently de minimus in revenues NextRadio should only be valued at a fraction of these companies, it is worth noting that the "portal" that Emmis has established is not readily re-creatable by anyone else, there are insurmountable barriers to entry, and the radio industry has decided to "go with Smulyan," as the way for the industry to collectively "capture" its own revenues, by "banding together" in utilizing this singularly chosen method of delivering its signal using the FM chip in smartphones. Such an achievement, on the part of Smulyan/Emmis, is by no means anything to sneeze at!
It is worth noting that Emmis has given its radio industry participants a call option to buy their ratable share of NextRadio. One of those options was exercisable in August of 2017. (The option expired unexercised, as NextRadio has yet to "take off.") The next one is exercisable in August 2019. The exercise price of the option is the greater of the appraised market value of NextRadio... or two times the amount of money Emmis has cumulatively invested in the business through August 2015.
While it may certainly be a "visions of sugarplums" exercise, it is interesting to speculate what could happen to Emmis's current $31 million market capitalization if it got a major player in the content business, or content delivery business (Netflix, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, etc.) to see the potential of NextRadio, and become a 10% investor in it, backing it with marketing muscle. Imagine, for a moment, one of these players wanting to partner with Emmis, and buying 10% of NextRadio for, say, $20 million. In such a scenario, it would suddenly "establish" a value for NextRadio's future potential at $200 million, which would catapult Emmis's stock.
In addition to the NextRadio-related assets, the company owns Digonex, which is a dynamic pricing solutions company. Management is convinced dynamic pricing for tickets is the wave of the future, and has stated it anticipates revenues (miniscule to date) to triple this fiscal year.
Sum Of The Parts Valuation Analysis (Sans Emerging Technology Ventures)
The company's latest investor presentation on its website (also filed on EDGAR on July 13, 2017) provides a basis for valuing Emmis's remaining radio assets. As shown on page 13 of the presentation, the median EV/EBITDA multiple of its peers is around 8.0x. Moreover, the recently announced Entercom/CBS Radio deal (which can be viewed as a bellwether for the industry) is being valued at nearly 8.0x.

Applying a modest discount for Emmis's controlled company status, equally offset by the generally higher quality nature of Emmis's stations/clusters (as evidenced by the high multiples received in recent asset sales, per page 11 of the investor presentation), I conservatively assigned an 8.0x multiple to Emmis's EBITDA. Per the company's most recent earnings release, ongoing adjusted TTM EBITDA from continuing operations (excluding losses from the emerging technology ventures) is $18 million. Using the 8.0x multiple, this would value the company's stations at $144 million. In addition, the company owns a number of additional assets not included in the above calculation. One of these is AM station WLIB, which is currently up for sale, and has minimal EBITDA, but which I would expect to net the company roughly $10 million. The next asset is the company's storied headquarters in downtown Indianapolis, on desirable Monument Circle, which, while not for sale, I conservatively value at $25 million. (At 135,000 square feet, the building cost $30 million to construct in 1998.) The next is the residual value of New York station WEPN, which is currently leased to Disney through 2024. The future stream of payments from Disney was securitized, shortly after the lease agreement was initiated, and Emmis received a lump sum at that time. The corresponding debt Emmis carries from the securitization is nonrecourse, with the ongoing lease payments from Disney expected to retire the debt completely by 2024. Therefore, the net present value of the station's future cash flows, post 2024 (when the lease expires), represents an asset to Emmis. My analysis yields an estimated residual value of the station of $25 million. (The station is carried on Emmis's books for $47 million currently.)

Emmis's Indianapolis Headquarters
The total value of all of the above assets is $204 million, but there is one more asset the company holds that investors have only recently become aware of.....
The Company Owns 70 Acres Of Prime Land Just Outside Indianapolis, A "Newly Monetizable" Asset
To little fanfare, Smulyan blandly announced, in the company's Q1 earnings conference call (but not in the company's earnings press release or 10-Q filing), that "we have some land that we might sell." That "land" is 70 acres on which towers sit for its Indianapolis AM station, WFNI. The land is located in Whitestown, surrounded by the massive Anson development project, off the I-65 exit at Whitestown Road (with some of the land actually fronting the interstate), making it extremely desirable for development. The area has been one of the fastest growing areas, population and business development-wise, in the state of Indiana, the last 6 years. Amazon, General Nutrition, and Daimler-Benz have all built huge distribution centers there. A plethora of mixed use housing, hotels, and massive shopping complexes are being built, and, as indicated in a recent Indianapolis Business Journal cover story from July 8, 2017, the area has been witnessing a burgeoning that is nothing short of breathtaking. This author personally visited the area in July, researched recent land sales, and discovered that a parcel just to the south of Emmis's 70-acre property recently sold for upwards of $500,000 an acre. (The parcel will be developed into an extended stay hotel.) While Emmis's property, in total, isn't worth nearly that, the author believes, based upon other property offered in the vicinity, that the land should be able to net Emmis at least $150,000 an acre, when all is said and done, which would total roughly $10 million.
Breakup Value Analysis Yields A Minimum $10.80 Per Share Valuation
Adding the $10 million for the land noted above, to the $204 million previously mentioned value for all the other assets, yields a total asset value of $214 million. Emmis currently has $79 million in recourse debt. Backing out that debt, yields $135 million in net asset value. $135 million, divided by the 12.5 million shares the company has outstanding, YIELDS A BREAKUP VALUE OF ABOUT $10.80 PER SHARE.

It should be noted that this analysis conservatively provides NO value for Emmis's emerging technology ventures, which are effectively valued at zero on the company's balance sheet, and whose costs have been expensed as incurred. (And yet, I would argue that Emmis has been building the NextRadio asset for the last 7 years, and should get SOME credit for establishing a product that has the potential, in the end, of being huge for the company, even if the odds of success may be, perhaps, no greater than 50/50.)
Alternative "Stick" Asset Valuation Technique Suggests $12.25 Per Share Breakup Value
The company provides, on page 29 of its most recent 10-K, a fair market value estimate of its radio station license clusters, or "stick" values. The total of the remaining owned stations (setting a residual value for New York station WEPN at $25 million) is $188 million. This compares favorably to the $179 million total valuation of the radio stations indicated above, using the 8.0x EV/EBITDA calculation. This "stick" valuation analysis (keeping in mind the double digit multiples of operating income received by Emmis in recent asset sales) implies that the previously mentioned 8.0 EV/EBITDA valuation for the company is too low. (This is true because the "stick" values only attribute value to Emmis's radio licenses as a "permit to broadcast"; no goodwill value is attributed to Emmis's concentrated clusters, or highly successful individual stations, such as Hot 97 in New York.) Such analysis suggests that a 9.0x multiple of EBITDA may be a better "floor" in calculating the breakup value of the company. Such a floor would set the breakup value at around $12.25 per share, which is probably not unrealistic, considering the cost synergies and other benefits that potential "piecemeal" acquirers would be able to realize, as well as the vanity value of a station like Hot 97. [Smulyan said in the company's Q1 conference call that Hot 97 "has been recognized as the single largest hip-hop brand in the world." The station is streamed to all kinds of places outside of New York. And the company is even considering expanding Hot 97 Summer Jam concerts globally (the company already held one in Tokyo), and looking to "figure out a way to leverage that brand," according to Smulyan.]
Valuation On Future Net Income (EPS) Yields 5x P/E Multiple And A Free Cash Flow (FCF) Yield Of Over 27%
Another way in which Emmis's undervaluation shows through, is to calculate a pro forma bottom line earnings per share for the company, once all expected asset sales are completed, debt is reduced to $60 million, and debt is refinanced at a lower interest rate. (We assume a refi at a 5.5% rate for this analysis, yielding $3.3 million in annual interest expense.) Taking the $18 million in ongoing trailing 12-month (TTM) adjusted EBITDA, deducting $4.4 million in TTM depreciation and amortization, and $3.3 million in interest expense, gives us an operating income of $10.3 million. Applying a 40% tax rate, gives us net income of $6.2 million. Divide that by 12.5 million shares outstanding, and you get 50 cents in earnings per share. This implies that Emmis is currently trading for 5x the imputed earnings per share of its regular radio operations (5 x .50= $2.50). Doing a similar calculation (based on $2.0 million in fiscal 2018 forecasted capital expenditures), yields $8.6 million in imputed FCF, on a $31 million market cap, which nets us a FCF yield of 27.5%.
The CEO Tried To Take The Company Private At $4.10 A Share A Year Ago And Was Turned Down
Roughly a year ago, reflecting a period of time in which the company's stock was taking it on the chin, owing primarily to the ratings problems at KPWR (with the stock, only a few months earlier, having suffered a humiliating 1 for 4 reverse split, in order to preserve its Nasdaq listing), Smulyan stepped in, and offered a lowball buyout premium of a few percentage points above the market price at the time. This, just as NextRadio was gearing up for a massive summer "rollout" and advertising push, across all of its participating stations. (Smulyan's offer cynically "capped" Emmis's stock, and made the "sizzle" from the NextRadio promotional push all go to waste...at least as far as Emmis's stock price was concerned.) Fortunately, owing in no small part to an aggressive campaign from certain major shareholders (including this author), a Special Committee of the company, charged with reviewing Smulyan's proposal, acted with integrity and independence, and required a higher purchase price from Smulyan, based upon the underlying asset value of the company. As no higher price was forthcoming, the Special Committee would not bless Smulyan's proposal, and Smulyan eventually terminated the offer. (Smulyan's termination letter directly stated "I am sorry we could not reach an agreement on the valuation.")
Interestingly enough, since this time, with all of the asset sales the company has, or will have, completed, I have no doubt Smulyan would now be in a much better position to offer, and be able to fund, a CONSIDERABLY higher price in any buyout offer. Specifically, when all delevering events noted above are said and done, I believe Smulyan would be able to comfortably fund a $6 per share buyout of the company.
It cannot be emphasized enough that, in my view, Smulyan's failed buyout, combined with the delevering events noted above, provide a sizable level of assurance, of not just the upside potential, but also the inherent "margin of safety" offered by Emmis's stock.
Imagine, just for example, besides other asset sales mentioned above, in order to fund a buyout, if Smulyan sold the company's trophy Indianapolis HQ for $25 million, and sold the "post-2024 value" of its New York radio station WEPN (currently licensed to Disney through 2024) for $25 million, effectively eliminating all but $10 million of the company's debt...but having a minor impact on ongoing EBITDA (assuming the company were to move into a nondescript office building in the Indianapolis suburbs). One can envision a scenario in which Smulyan could easily take on 4x leverage, for the company's remaining $18 million in annual EBITDA, which would allow him to pay out $62 million to the company's 11.25 million shares outstanding (not owned by him), which would equate to a payment of well over $5.50 per share. At 4 1/2 times leverage, he could pay at least $6.30 per share, in a buyout.
With all this in mind, the stock should be trading HIGHER (not lower), than it was a year ago, when Smulyan was trying to buy the company for $4.10 a share, as the underlying asset value, relative to the debt, is now much more evident. (Shareholders own a much larger percentage of the company's total enterprise value, compared to a year ago.) This will be even more apparent, when the company completes the sale of WLIB, and potentially, the 70 acre Whitestown land parcel.
Tantalizingly, in Smulyan's amended 13D filing with the SEC last October, which announced his termination of the go private offer, it was stated: "Mr. Smulyan may, from time to time, commence discussions with directors of the Issuer regarding a potential offer with terms similar to or different than those of the proposal described herein, determine to make a similar proposal on similar or different terms than those of the proposal described herein, otherwise increase his ownership of the Issuer’s common stock, approve an extraordinary corporate transaction with regard to the Issuer or engage in any of the events set forth in Items 4(a) through (j) of Schedule 13D, except that Mr. Smulyan currently has no intention of selling any shares of the Issuer’s common stock."
Upside Risks To Scenario
NextRadio could be a huge hit, or Emmis could procure a "big name" outside investor, that suddenly allows it to be seen as valuable, rather than (by some) as a money-draining albatross. Even if NextRadio doesn't catch on, the data analytics from it could become an important audience measuring tool for broadcasters and advertisers.
Spotify going public this fall could increase public interest in Emmis and NextRadio.
Emmis may now (or soon) be delevered enough that it could decide to spin off NextRadio, as a standalone entity, garnering its own independent "identity" on the Street.
The New York station cluster's change of personnel, and improved ratings, could foretell an upswing in sales, ad rates, and EBITDA.
Smulyan could be tempted to take another run at the company, with the stock price down 40% from his previous offer, and the company significantly delevered over the past year.
Downside Risks To Scenario
Radio continues to be a slowly declining market, overall. The secular headwinds are real.
The company's acquisition of certain New York stations a few years ago was ill-timed. Big city markets are witnessing I-Heart, Cumulus, and others dumping ad inventory, and pressing these markets more than the smaller markets, hurting Emmis. This trend may continue for an indefinite period of time.
The CEO has not been successful in getting the company to trade at a value more representative of underlying asset value. He wants to keep the company "for himself," and, in fact, in the go private proposal of a year ago, expressly stated his REFUSAL to entertain 3rd party bids for the company...even though his own offer was egregiously below the company's breakup value. As such, Emmis's stock may continue to trade with a sizable "controlled entity discount."
NextRadio and Digonex may continue to "bleed" Emmis's profits, and the CEO may delay "pulling the plug" from "his babies." (They are currently bleeding $8 million, on a trailing 12-month EBITDA basis, which "eats up" almost 1/2 of Emmis's ongoing radio EBITDA.)
Conclusion
While I have little doubt that Emmis Communications would net $11-12 for shareholders in an orderly breakup (the average of the two $10.80 and $12.25 breakup scenarios above), and may very well have an even higher value, it is NOT likely to be broken up, because the wishes of the CEO and founder have been made clear. No 3rd party unsolicited bids for company assets (or the entire company) are being sought. Therefore, the question is what kind of discount to apply to that breakup value, in setting a reasonable price target for the stock.
While it may seem somewhat arbitrary, and I admit that it is completely intuitive on my part, I like to set a multiple of 10-12x future fully taxed earnings, or 1x book value, or 1/2 of my $11-12 breakup number. All 3 of these numbers argue for a median target of right around $6 per share, and that, indeed, is my 12 to 18-month target for Emmis's stock.
Emmis is clearly underfollowed and underloved. It is thinly traded. It is a microcap. No analysts follow it. It is a controlled entity, in an industry that is out of favor. It is an industry that is trading at a fraction of Spotify (Private:MUSIC), Pandora (NYSE:P), etc., yet those companies lose money, and the cash flows here are REAL. Finally, this breakup value analysis provides no value for NextRadio, and my guess is there would be a buyer for the entire thing at $10-25 million, as a bare minimum, adding a potential $1-2 per share in additional breakup value.
Disclosures: The author is a major shareholder of Emmis, and owns 532,000 shares of the company's Class A common stock, or 4.7% of the Class, making him the company's third largest outside shareholder. Additions were made to this article by Jeremy Blum, also a Seeking Alpha contributor.
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Disclosure: I am/we are long EMMS.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
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