Introduction and Caveats
All of the data in this article is sourced from various Annual Updates, Shareholder Letters and Weekly NAV Reports that are on the Pershing Square Holdings (OTCPK:PSHZF) website, http://ift.tt/108Cq7S. Links to the individual items are on the Home Page.
Note that PSHZF is designed to replicate Ackman's domestic "Strategy Funds", Pershing Square L.P., Pershing Square International and Pershing Square II. However, PSHZF is leveraged and the Strategy Funds are not. Performance of the Strategy Funds will be close to but not likely identical to the publicly reported PSHZF numbers.
PSHZF's Investment Performance
PSHZF just disclosed its 2016 investment performance data in its "Annual Investor Update Presentation, 26 January 2017". Pershing Square and its Benchmark S&P 500 data are on Page 5
Ackman's Annual Update Presentation published numbers from the beginning of 2013.
TABLE 1
Ackman did not publish his Average Annual Compound Rate of Return over the most recent four years, but it is a simple calculation. Over the 4-year period Ackman presented, the Average Annual Compound Return for Ackman and for his S&P 500 benchmark were 1.4% and 14.3%, respectively. Ackman is behind his benchmark by a startling 12.9% per year! I would guess that Ackman's performance against his benchmark over the past 4 years might be among the worst in the world as measured against a universe of large hedge fund and more conventional money managers.
Who are Ackman's Clients?
Ackman's clients are typically University Endowments, Union Pension and/or Health and Benefit Funds, Corporate Pension and Health and Benefit Funds, State or Local Government Employee Benefit funds, and the pension and/or Endowment Funds of Museums, Hospitals and a myriad of other non-profit eleemosynary institutions - almost all of those institutions are tax-exempt. In addition, some of Ackman's clients are "Funds of Funds" - companies that pool investors' money to buy a portfolio of several hedge funds, diversifying away some of both the downside risk as well as the potential gain. Also, it is likely that a few of Ackman's clients might be very wealthy individuals. All of his clients are very large pools of capital; Ackman almost certainly has a minimum investment, and my guess is his minimum is $25 - $50 million or so. In almost all cases, Ackman's clients' investment with him is just one of several asset allocations they have in their overall portfolios and they have one or several other money managers working for them.
Ackman's Performance Impact on Clients
Underperformance in percentages is a bit ephemeral. The money differential from Ackman's massive under-performance vs. his benchmark is very real to his clients. What follows is a theoretical example of Ackman's negative impact on what might be a typical client. Although theoretical, in my experience this model fits most if not all of Ackman's real world clients.
Assume in late 2012 there are two large universities, University A and University B, each reviewing the asset allocation for its Endowment Fund. Assume each decides that beginning on January 1, 2013 (the date Ackman uses in his most recent presentation), it will re-allocate $100 million of its Endowment Fund to domestic equities. Each university then needs to decide who should manage the new allocation. Both universities use their Endowment Funds to support operating expenses by using a "Spending Rule"; typically they will spend more or less 5%/year of their Endowment Funds' value. For the sake of this model assume the Spending Rule is applied to beginning-of-the-year balances. So, the $100 million each university invests on January 1, 2013 will provide $5 million in 2013 to support faculty salaries, student scholarships and other expenses. Both universities share the same Investment Objective, which is to grow the value of the Endowment Fund conservatively but steadily over the years so that ever-larger allocations from the Fund will be available to support student scholarships, faculty salaries and other university operating expenses.
Typically, this would be the decision-making process…
The universities' Boards of Trustees are responsible for decisions about their Endowment Funds. Typically, the Trustees will delegate that responsibility to an Investment Committee (I.C.) but the Board retains ultimate authority and responsibility. The I.C. will consist primarily of Trustees, typically with significant investment experience. The I.C. will have one or more outside expert Consultants to assist with actuarial matters, asset allocation, outside investment manager hiring and firing and other issues. The Consultant will have a huge database with intricate details about every aspect of every outside investment manager they bring to the table.
When University A's I.C. met in late 2012, their Consultant recommended using an S&P 500 Fund for the new domestic equities allocation. Their logic was their belief that the key to long-term success is correct asset allocation and they did not want to have a correct re-allocation of $100 million turn out to be wrong because of "Manager Risk"; i.e. they picked the right asset allocation but the investment manager they picked underperformed its benchmark. University A's I.C. agreed with their Consultant and on January 1, 2013 they invested $100 million in a S&P 500 fund.
When University B's I.C. gathered in late 2012, their Consultant recommended hiring Ackman. It was clearly a more aggressive strategy. But, the logic was that Ackman had a great long-term record of outperforming the benchmark S&P 500, he was clearly a Wall Street "Whiz Kid" and, when he was successful in outperforming the S&P 500, University B would be able to spend even more money on scholarships, faculty salaries and other expenses down the road. University B's I.C. was even more impressed with Pershing Square's presentation to them, because for a potential $100 million account, Ackman himself would have shown up to make the pitch. And we all know Ackman's charisma, "star power" and amazing investment record - at least back then - was amazingly effective. Even sophisticated Trustees like to go back to their country clubs and brag to their buddies about how the great Bill Ackman came to see them to make a sales pitch. Ultimately, University B's I.C. agreed with their Consultant and they decided to "go for it". Ackman's record at the time was so good they decided that even though everyone knows past performance does not guarantee future results they were confident in his ability to continue his benchmark-beating record. So, on January 1, 2013 University B invested $100 million with Ackman with the goal of outperforming the S&P 500 over time.
Now, for the sake of this example/model, assume each University uses its annual Endowment spending only to fund scholarships and assume an average scholarship award at both universities is $20,000. Table 2 shows how many scholarships each University's 2013 investment would have allowed them to award.
TABLE 2
Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Analysis of this table is very simple. Over the 4 years of Ackman's management, University A's Endowment's investment in the S&P 500 fund had grown to $170.8 million. University B's Endowment investment with Ackman had grown to $105.8 million. In other words, thanks to Ackman's underperformance, both absolutely and against his benchmark, his client University B is $65.0 million poorer than University A which owned a simple S&P 500 index fund. Also as a result of Ackman's underperformance, over the four years University B had nearly 300 fewer scholarships to award compared to University A. And even more crucially, because University B invested with Ackman, at the beginning of 2017 its Endowment Fund has a value that is $65.0 million less than it would have had if it invested in an index fund. Going forward, that $65.0 million deficit translates into over 250 fewer available scholarships EVERY YEAR. The scholarship deficit might be a bit higher or a bit lower going forward, depending on how well or badly Ackman does compared to the S&P 500 in any future time period. But the basic fact is that University B is fundamentally 250 scholarships behind the eight ball because they invested with Ackman instead of his benchmark. That is what's called "Manager Risk"!
Although this analysis is theoretical, it is, in my experience, totally indicative of a typical very real client. And it is my belief that nearly all of Ackman's clients face the same situation; after four years, their ability to fund their pension obligations, employee health care expenses, art acquisitions, medical research and other institutional financial needs is sharply reduced because of their investment in Ackman rather than his benchmark S&P 500 fund.
Can Ackman Ever Catch Up?
The first rule of making money is not to lose it.
In the world of professional investors, even though Ackman made a profit of $5.8 million for University B, he lost $65 million of their money against his benchmark. As shown above, to a client, that is a very real loss.
At the end of 2016, University A's S&P 500 investment has $170.8 Million and University B's Ackman investment has $105.8 Million. To catch up to University A's simple investment in an index fund, Ackman's University B portfolio would have to increase by 61% while the S&P is unchanged! Saying that another way, Ackman's University B portfolio would have to outperform the S&P 500 by 61% just to catch up. And, saying it a third way, if the market goes up by say, a total of 10% over the next two years, Ackman would have to go up by 71% during that same time period just to break even against his benchmark!
The mathematics is just too overwhelming. I have never seen or heard of anything like that happening in the history of professional money management. It is highly likely that Ackman will never catch up. The simple math is just too challenging.
Why Do Clients Redeem?
In his January 26, 2016 Shareholders Letter, Ackman himself described why clients retain or fire managers. He said…
"Clients rarely fire a manager for modest performance below the benchmark for any one year, but client engagements and mutual fund flows are often lost if the variance is dramatic in any one year."
Ackman has had a variance of (12.9 %) ON AVERAGE FOR FOUR YEARS, not just one year. His year-by-year variances over the past four years have been: (23%), +26%, (22%) and (25%).
Using Ackman's own words, clients have patience with managers for "modest" underperformance and fire managers with "dramatic" underperformance. "Dramatic" doesn't seem like a strong enough word to describe Ackman's underperformance.
If his remaining clients listen to Ackman's own description about when to fire managers, they would all fire him as soon as possible!
What Will University B Do?
University B will have had its Q3:2016 Trustee and Trustee Committees meetings in October 2016. The I.C.'s Consultant would have delivered detailed updates about each outside manager and they would have heard - as they had at most previous I.C. quarterly meetings over the past four years - that Ackman was behind once again. They will be frustrated when they look at the number of scholarships they had to deny because of Ackman. They would be concerned that Ackman's now-tarnished reputation would rub off on the University; does University B really want to be associated with Valeant - a drug price gouger? Does it want to be associated with Ackman's highly public attack on Herbalife when the broad-based public knows Ackman's short sale has been a financial disaster? And they are seriously concerned about their major donors to the Endowment Fund. When the major donors - and it is highly likely almost all the outside Trustees are major donors - see the Endowment Fund investment results, they will believe that the Trustees and their Investment Committee were guilty of mismanagement of the Endowment Fund.
The Consultant to University B is in trouble. It is likely that firm not only recommended Ackman in the first place but also continued to defend him for the previous couple of years. That firm is toast.
So, here's what happens... In their Q3:2016 Trustee meeting, each of the Trustee Committees would report to the full Board. While Ackman's final results would not be reported until January, the I.C. would have been following closely. During their Committee meeting preceding the full Board meeting, the I.C. discussion about Ackman would note the following...
- His Investment Style had drifted from activist to stock-picker; in the prior few years his activism had generated positive Alpha in Air Products 2 or 3 years prior, but in largest current positions, QSR, CMG or MDLZ that together are 2/3 of his portfolio, there is little evidence that Ackman's activism has created any positive Alpha.
- The I.C. would note that Ackman had made and very publicly defended two of the most highly public and worst investments in high-end professional money management history.
- They would decide they no longer wanted to be associated with a drug price gouger, especially since it turned out to be one of the worst longs in history.
- They wouldn't like being associated with a manager who was totally wrong on one of the most publicly visible short sales in history. They might note sarcastically that HLF was one of Ackman's best stocks since he bought it in December 2012. It went from the low 30's when he announced his short to around $60 now, a gain of more or less 75%. If he'd been on the long side instead of the wrong side of that trade, it would have been one of his best stocks over the time frame!
- They would note that his historic "patience" looked very much like it had turned into "stubbornness".
- As smart as he is, he had violated a primary principal of money management: cut your losses and let your profits run. Instead, he had sold some of his winners and kept defending his two huge losers
- They would note his January 26, 2016 Investor Letter in which he both announced that 2015 was his worst year ever and also wrote several pages of excuses for all the things he did wrong in 2015. He blamed index funds, he accused the "market" of not being smart enough to see the same "intrinsic values" as he saw in many of his stocks that went down. He blamed his "followers" for turning on him and getting out of his stocks. He blamed short sellers. He blamed other hedge funds who traded against him. Oh, he also took a little blame himself. It was multiple pages of excuses and promises he'd never do it again.
- The I.C. would have noted, probably more than once, that one of their most important stakeholders groups are donors to the Endowment Fund, and, with Ackman and his performance being so public, some large donors might be very upset at what they would consider the Trustees' mismanagement of the Fund.
- And, of course, the I.C. would focus on Ackman's numbers and the substantial negative impact on the University that investing with him had caused.
By the time of the University's annual Trustee meeting in late January 2017, they would have likely decided they had enough. They would have already fired the Consultant -- that part is easy -- and they would shortly begin the process of redeeming their money from Ackman.
Is There Any Evidence Ackman's Clients are Jumping Ship? Can Net Redemptions be Estimated?
A July 2016 Bloomberg report ( http://ift.tt/2m8RJNS) on Ackman's redemptions quoted Ackman as saying:
"As a percentage of capital redeemed in the first half over the past eight years, the first six months of this year "would be sixth-lowest," and 37 percent lower than the firm's average, Ackman said Wednesday on a Pershing Square investor conference call. My guess is that our redemptions that we've received as a percentage of capital are probably among the lowest in the industry, and that's really because we benefit from a very stable capital base and that's because our investors have been incredibly supportive of us," he said.
I'm certain what Ackman said was accurate. However, it is my speculation that he did not disclose the entire story. I think he might have been referring to redemptions as a percent of TOTAL AUM. Total AUM included a large amount of Non-Redeemable "Permanent" AUM. The number he should have disclosed was redemptions as a percent of Redeemable AUM. To my knowledge Ackman has not made those numbers public, but it is a near-certainty that the Consulting community and all Ackman's clients will know actual redemption numbers. Knowing the actual dollar level of redemptions as a percent of Redeemable AUM is a key data point to any conclusion about Pershing Square's future viability. That, in turn is a key driver of clients' decisions to hang on or fire him.
To my knowledge, Ackman has not made a recent public release of new investments into his funds, redemptions out of his funds or net sales or redemptions. However, it is possible to estimate 2016 net redemptions based on the information in Ackman's January 2016 and January 2017 "Annual Update Presentations".
Here is the publicly reported data that can be used to estimate redemptions.
- Pershing Square's AUM on December 31 of 2015 and 2016, respectively, were $14.8 Billion and $11.0 Billion, down $3.8 Billion, or 26% in 2016.
- Ackman reported his PSHZF investment return was -13.5% in 2016. It is important to note that this was reported performance for PSHZF, which is leveraged, so it is only approximately the same as Ackman's Strategy Funds, which are not leveraged.
- Ackman sold the underlying stock of Air Products and closed Fund V in 2016 and those AUM were $487 Million at the beginning of 2016.
- As of December 31, 2015 Ackman defined his "Permanent Capital" as a percent of total AUM as a combination of: a.
GP and Affiliates (Ackman personally, PS employees and possibly others): 5% b. Deferred Incentive Fees (Due to Expire at Jan 1, 2017): 3% c. Pershing Square Holdings NAV: 34%, and d. Pershing Square Holdings Bond: 7% - Total Permanent AUM: 49%
- "External Capital" (Redeemable AUM): 51%
Calculation #1 - Where is what Ackman calls "External Capital" and I call "Redeemable AUM" as of December 31, 2015?
As of year-end 2015, Ackman's AUM totaled $14.8 billion. Redeemable AUM is 51% of the total, or $7.5 billion.
All of the "Redeemable AUM" has to be in one of Ackman's three Strategy Funds, Pershing Square LP ($4.2 billion), Pershing Square International ($4.7 billion) and Pershing Square II ($0.1 billion) and all other AUM is Permanent Capital. Total AUM in the three Strategy Funds is $9.0 billion at the end of 2015/beginning of 2016.
The difference between total AUM in the Strategy Funds ($9.0 billion) and Redeemable AUM ($7.5 billion) is $1.5 billion. That difference is Permanent Capital and is a combination of GP/Affiliate AUM (5% = $0.7 billion), Deferred Incentive Fees (3% = $0.4 billion) and Other ($0.4 billion). The estimate of $1.5 billion of Permanent Capital in the Strategy Funds may be significantly inaccurate. My best guess is the real number is somewhere between $1.2 and $1.6 billion.
Using the data above, it is fairly straightforward to estimate Ackman's net redemptions in 2016. You start with his Redeemable AUM as of the beginning of 2016. You reduce Redeemable AUM by his reported investment performance, (13.5%) to get Pro-Forma AUM at the end of 2016. Any year-end difference between Pro-Forma Redeemable AUM and Actual Redeemable AUM should represent a good estimate of net sales or redemptions during 2016.
TABLE 3
Here's how to understand Table 3.
Redeemable AUM at the beginning of 2016 was $7.5 billion. If those AUM had an investment loss of the reported 13.5%, the pro-forma investment loss would have been $1.0 billion and the pro-forma ending Redeemable AUM balance would have been $6.5 billion. But the actual Redeemable AUM balance was $5.2 billion. The difference between the actual balance and the pro-forma balance of $1.3 billion represents an estimate of Ackman's 2016 redemptions. That calculates to client defections of a startling 17% of the beginning of year Redeemable AUM! That is especially dramatic given that for the most part redeeming clients were allowed to take only 12.5% per quarter of their assets. That suggests that most of 2016's estimated $1.3 billion redemptions will continue into 2017 AND will be increased by any redemptions initiated in 2017!
In addition, it appears Ackman suffered a one-time redemption of approximately $0.5 billion in 2016. He closed his special purpose Fund V by selling off its underlying APD stock. There is no indication in his numbers what happened to those assets. It is possible that the Fund V clients took all of their money and went home. It is also possible that some of the money redeemed from Fund V went into the Strategy Funds; if that happened, then the estimated redemptions out of the Strategy Funds would be higher.
Putting it all together, between market losses, redemptions and distributions Ackman's total AUM dropped from $14.8 billion to $11.0 billion in 2016, a decline of $3.8 billion, which is 26% of his starting assets. From the near-peak AUM $18.3 billion on December 31, 2014 to December 31, 2016, Ackman's AUM has declined by $7.3 billion, which is a decline of 40% over two years.
What does Ackman have left to manage? What are his annualized revenues?
At the end of 2016 and going into 2017, here are a mixture of reported numbers and my estimates of what Ackman has left over to manage:
Strategy Funds AUM
The three Strategy Funds had combined AUM of $6.5 billion at year-end 2016. That included what I estimated above at $1.3 billion in GP and Affiliates' AUM, meaning that fee-earning AUM is about $5.2 billion. It is interesting to note that Ackman probably lost approximately $400 million in incentive-fee revenue because previously Deferred Incentive Fees expired on January 1, 2017 unless earned. Ackman hasn't reported on that but I assume Ackman did not earn those fees so they would have likely had to be returned to shareholders of the Funds. That would mean beginning of year Strategy Fund AUM was $6.1 billion, including the same $5.2 billion in AUM owned by outside clients. However, it is possible the $400 million in expired Incentive Fees simply reverts to the client-owned funds instead of Ackman. It's a bit confusing, but depending on whether the Deferred Incentive Fees were returned to clients in cash or shares of the Strategy Funds, total AUM in the strategy funds as of January 1, 2017 would be either $6.1 or $6.5 billion and outside-client owned AUM in the Strategy Funds would be either $5.2 or $5.6 billion. The outside client-owned AUM paid approximately 1.5% in annual management fees, which equals about $78 - $84 million.
I estimated above that client-owned fee-earning AUM would redeem at approximately $1.0 - $2.0 billion/year going forward; each $1.0 billion of redemptions reduces Ackman's annual fee revenues by about $15 million.
Pershing Square Holdings
PSHZF had $4.5 billion AUM at year-end 2016. That included $1.0 billion of fund-level debt that pays 5.5%, or $55 million/year. Based on various documents on the PSHZF website I estimate approximately $0.2 billion AUM are management shares that pay no fees. PSHZF AUM also pay Ackman 1.5% annual management fees. On an annualized basis Ackman is earning approximately $68 million.
Total AUM and Annualized Fees
Adding the numbers together… As of January 1, 2017, Ackman's total AUM is approximately $10.6 - $11.0 billion. Of that, approximately $5.4 billion is Permanent Capital ($4.5 billion in PSHZF and $0.9 billion GP and Affiliates AUM in the Strategy Funds). The AUM balance of $5.2 - $5.6 billion is in outside client owned Redeemable AUM in the Strategy Funds.
Ackman is earning annualized fees of approximately $150 million.
Although $150 million/year sounds like a lot of money, it's effectively mutual fund level fees - chump change for a big-time hedge fund manager. Hedge Fund managers are in it for the Carried Interest / "Incentive Fees". Consider this: Before Ackman launched the public offering of PSHZF, Pershing Square Holdings was a roughly $3 billion hedge fund. According to the PSHZF Prospectus, in the 18 months from January 1, 2013 until June 30, 2014, Ackman earned $52 million in Management Fees PLUS $153 million in Incentive Fees! And the incentive fees for PSHZF were at only a 16% rate for Pershing Square Holdings vs. 20% for Ackman's much larger Strategy Funds. It's no wonder Ackman is a billionaire!!
Ackman's financial problem is that because of High Water Marks, he will not likely earn any Carried Interest for some time. At PSHZF's recent $19.01 NAV, the fund will need to increase 54% to the $29.27 reached in August 4, 2015 before Ackman qualifies for future Incentive Fees from PSHZF. We can assume a similar increase is needed before he qualifies for Carried Interest in his Strategy Funds.
Does Ackman see trouble ahead for Pershing Square?
Ackman took two actions in 2016 that were unusual and suggest to me he does.
First, consider PS's revenues. Ackman generates annual management fees of around 1.5% on most of his assets. But, as per the calculation above, I estimate that fee-earning AUM is at a low point not seen since before 2013. And, unlike that time, he has no future potential to earn Carried Interest.
That means Ackman generates annual management fees of about $150 Million. That's lots of money to pay himself as well as his professional and support staffs. But, that money shrinks by $15 million for every billion dollars of net redemptions. And, as above, I am estimating redemptions of $1.5 - $2.0 billion in 2017 and beyond. But, the real golden goose at Pershing Square - and every other hedge fund - has always been Carried Interest and, as mentioned above, PS will not earn any Carry for some time into the future.
That creates a problem for holding onto his professional investment staff. Any analyst good enough to work at PS is likely good enough to work at any high-end hedge fund. Those people are the ultimate free agents.
High quality analysts are loyal only to their own careers and money. They'll work for whoever will pay them the most, or, if they are good enough, might leave to start their own hedge fund. At most hedge funds where they might work, they've got the opportunity to participate, in one way or the other, in the Carried Interest. Ackman can't offer that any longer.
So, in order to prevent his investment staff from jumping ship Ackman created a special incentive plan. Ackman likely owns all (or almost all) of Pershing Square personally but in 2016, for the first time ever, he offered part of the equity in the firm as an incentive to keep long-term employees at the firm. There is no question to me he created that plan simply because, without any Carried Interest in the short-term future, his best people would walk out the door.
Second, he offered clients a fee break if they were willing to pay a larger share of Carried Interest going forward. At around 1.5%, Ackman's management fees are already below average for high-end hedge funds. One interpretation is that he is so confident about his ability to get back into the Carried Interest zone in the future he is willing to give up some short-term fee income now to earn more Carry later. Another interpretation is that he's trying to save some clients who might otherwise abandon ship.
What Does It All Mean for Pershing Square?
Hedge funds open and close all the time. They open because of the great reputation and prior performance of its lead owner and they close because of sub-par performance. Here are a couple of examples of a huge trend…
Big names like George Soros, Stanley Druckenmiller and Julian Robertson have closed funds because of sub-par performance. But they are just among some of the more visible in a history of large numbers of hedge funds closing their doors.
Will Ackman's fund survive? If he loses most of his Redeemable Assets over the next two years - as I believe he will - are his Permanent AUM enough to keep his doors open? I don't believe the Permanent Assets alone are enough. His firm is already a shadow of its former self and his reputation is gone; he used to be considered an oracle and a whiz kid but now he's fallen into near-irrelevance.
Almost all the big-name hedge funds that have closed did so because of relatively small performance lags vs. their benchmarks. A 200 to 300 basis point lag after 2 - 3 years is usually enough for Consultants to give up and clients to leave. Ackman has lagged his benchmark by an average of 1,290 basis points PER YEAR over the past four years. That is almost unheard of among hedge funds that are going concerns. In the past, almost all the big names that have had embarrassing performance and large redemptions chose to liquidate what was left and retreated into managing their personal money. They enter the world of PIPs - previously important people.
Will Ackman's permanent capital keep him afloat? Maybe, but once "GP and Affiliates" money is taken out, there won't be a lot of client money left and even what's there will pay him mutual fund - not hedge fund - fee levels.
And, the reality is that even his PSHZF closed end fund might not be truly "permanent". In his November 24, 2014 Letter to Shareholders, he all but promised PSHZF would trade at a premium...
"Over time,we believe that if we continue to generate attractive rates of returns, PSH should trade at a premium to its NAV or book value (the book value of PSH equals its NAV because we mark our assets and liabilities to market). While trading at a premium to NAV is not a common occurrence for most closed end funds, we believe that Pershing Square's performance history and PSH's strategy, scale, liquidity and structure differentiate PSH from the typical closed end fund."
And, of course, PSHZF has traded at a large and significant discount virtually its entire life.
The investors and shareholders in PSHZF include some of the largest, most famous and most influential firms and people on Wall Street. In the prospectus, 3% or larger investors included Blackstone Alternative Asset Management, Rothschild Wealth Management, Qatar Holdings, Forsta Ap- Fonden and Schroeder & Co Bank. Their investments are almost certainly a combination of their own money and client money. If they want their money back Ackman will be hard pressed to say, "No". And, he can do it easily. When closed-end funds trade at a discount for a long time, as an accommodation to shareholders, the investment manager can "open-end" the fund to make shareholder liquidations possible. That happens frequently in the closed-end fund world.
So, even Ackman's "Permanent" AUM might not be so permanent.
IMO, I believe Ackman will decide it isn't worth the ongoing public scrutiny of his numbers, angry clients calling him all the time and public embarrassment. For Ackman's large ego, his huge fall from grace will be such a big embarrassment I doubt he'd want to keep his doors open.
What is the Market Impact on Ackman's Stocks if He Closes Pershing Square?
Ackman holds a limited number of stocks: In order of size (% of total portfolio), they are: Restaurant Brands Int'l (NYSE:QSR) 32%, Chipolte Mexican Grill (NYSE:CMG) 18%, Mondelez Int'l (NASDAQ:MDLZ) 17%, Air Products (NYSE:APD) 9%, Howard Hughes (NYSE:HHC) 7%, Platform Specialty Products (NYSE:PAH) 7%, Nomad Foods (NYSE:NOMD) 5%, Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) 5%. He is short Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) and he might possibly hold other small undisclosed shorts.
Given the past, it is interesting to note that Valeant's price decline has now demoted the stock to the Ackman's smallest position from one of his largest!
If, as redemptions pick up as I forecast they will, Ackman will be forced to sell more of his stock. And if he opens PSHZF to redemptions, he might have to sell even more. Of course, those are two big "ifs", but I believe they are likely. If he is forced to sell, it is unclear whether he will sell the more or less liquid positions first. An argument can be made for each path. As an outside investor, pay particular attention to his smaller cap stocks, where his own and others' actions can have more impact. And pay attention to HLF, as Ackman is responsible for a very large portion of an enormous short position in the stock.
One can assume that almost every Ackman stock has a bit of "Ackman Premium" priced in: a hope the stock will outperform simply because Ackman is involved. If there are any indications he is selling any of his stocks (or covering any of his shorts) there will likely be a magnified impact on that stock or stocks.
Actually, Ackman himself tells us what to expect. In his January 26, 2016 Shareholder Letter, trying to explain why his stocks so dramatically underperformed in 2015 (he uses words like, "… massive declines in values…", "…the rest of our portfolio went into free-fall…", etc.) he says (emphasis added)…
"The Pershing Square Correlation
"Perhaps the largest correlation in our portfolio is one that we have not previously considered; that is, the fact that we own large stakes in each of these companies. We have had the benefit of a "following" of investors who track and own many of our holdings. This has given us significantly greater clout than is reflected by our percentage ownership of these companies, and we believe that it is partially what has caused the "pop" in market price when we announce a new active investment. As a result, these active managers' performance is often closely tied with ours. When Valeant's stock price collapsed, our performance, and that of Pershing Square followers, [sic] were dramatically affected. Nearly all of these investment managers are subject to daily, monthly, and quarterly redemptions, and therefore, many were likely forced to liquidate substantial portions of their holdings which overlap with our own.
"While we review the ownership structure of a company before we invest to look for large holders who might be opposed to the type of corporate changes we intend to advocate, whether a company is in the S&P 500 or other major stock market indexes, or whether the owners are hedge funds or passive investors has not played a meaningful role in our analysis. We select investments based on business quality, discount to intrinsic value, and catalysts to unlock value, but not principally based on who else owns or will own the stock. The vulnerability of a company to an overall market decline, a short seller attack, or negative headlines is highly correlated with the nature of the investors who are the principal holders.
"Companies like Mondelez and Zoetis whose owners are principally index funds, ETFs, and other passive investors have much more stable and more "permanent" ownership bases, and appear, therefore, to suffer from much less volatility. Even Air Products, which is in the S&P 500, has suffered from the fact that it is the fifth most hedge fund owned stock in the index, and hedge fund liquidations may, therefore, explain its substantial underperformance compared with its direct competitor Praxair since year-end. As of this writing, Air Products has declined by ~9% since year-end, while Praxair, which has the 8th lowest hedge fund ownership of companies in the S&P 500, has only declined 4%. We believe that these exaggerated stock price movements represent a short-term opportunity for long-term investors to accumulate additional shares at attractive prices.
"While it is impossible to know for sure, we believe that our continued negative outperformance in the first few weeks of the year relates primarily to forced selling of our holdings by investors whose stakes overlap with our own."
There you have it. Among other things Ackman "blamed" some of his bad performance on other hedge funds trading against his stocks, Pershing Square "followers" getting out ahead of him or index funds that don't recognize the values he sees in his stocks. As Pershing Square redemptions pick up Ackman will be forced to sell more of his stocks. If there is even a hint of accelerating redemptions or forced or other sales out of the Ackman funds, the other hedge fund piranhas in the world will know about every position and every trade and they will trade against him. All of that will mean continued underperformance for many of his stocks.
If you are following Ackman in any of his longs or shorts, be prepared for "The Pershing Square Correlation".
Conclusion
Ackman is an intense competitor and, despite all odds, he might recover. On the other hand, Gotham Partners is an example of his throwing in the towel and walking away. Many other brilliant hedge fund managers have closed their funds with far less reason to do so that Ackman now has. Ultimately, it is up to his clients and his ego and whether or not he is able to generate an almost-unheard of relative performance recovery.
Watch closely.
Disclosure: I am/we are long HLF, AND I MIGHT TRADE IN THAT STOCK AT ANY TIME. I AM NOT INVESTED LONG OR SHORT OF ANY OTHER STOCKS MENTIONED IN THIS ARTICLE, ALTHOUGH I MIGHT INITIATE POSITIONS AT ANY TIME.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
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